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CHAPTER 4 
 
The British Legacy in the Middle East 
Anthony Gorman 
 
From the middle of the 19th century until the mid-20th century, Britain played a 
significant role in determining the development of political institutions and practices 
of citizenship in the Middle East that was to leave a substantial legacy. Articulated in 
different ways according to the particular needs of the situation, the British imperial 
project engaged with local regimes and traditions, the requirements of the 
contemporary international context, and where necessary popular demands, to lay a 
foundation of public culture and practice based on conceptions of nationality and 
citizenship and democratic institutions as the basis of a body politic, even as it 
qualified the scope and authority of such institutions. In so doing it sought to 
establish its own priority of establishing stable states sympathetic to its imperial 
interests. The result was a mixed legacy that provided a legal framework of 
citizenship and constitutional rule but qualified rights and a tradition of authoritarian 
rule with which to curb opposition that would readily taken up by local elites. In 
exploring the evolution of these conceptions and practices of citizenship during this 
period, this chapter will focus on the cases of Egypt, the mandates of Iraq, Palestine 
and Transjordan, and the Gulf states of Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 
Background 
From the beginning of the nineteenth century Britain came to exercise an 
increasingly significant and at times dominant role in Middle Eastern political affairs. 
While its role in the defeat of the French in Egypt in 1801 announced its presence in 
the region it did not take up a more specific authority until the second half of the 
century. With the occupation of Egypt in 1882 which continued in various guises, 
from the initial so-called veiled protectorate to the formal protectorate of 1914-
1922, and on until its withdrawal in 1956, Britain embarked on the first major 
example of a number of imperial commitments. In the mandatory administrations of 
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Iraq (1923-1932), Palestine (1923-1948) and Transjordan (1923-1946) constructed 
from the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Britain played a more 
formal role of mentoring these new states under the authority of the League of 
Nations. In Kuwait, Bahrain and other Trucial states a series of treaties signed by 
Britain with local rulers during the nineteenth century and maintained until its 
formal withdrawal from the Gulf at the beginning of the 1970s formed the basis of 
British imperium, guaranteeing its control in matters of defence and foreign affairs 
while supporting the rule of the traditional ruling families.  
 
These particular political circumstances afforded Britain an environment in which it 
exercised considerable authority in erecting the constitutional architecture and 
influencing the culture of citizenship. This was exercised in different ways. In Egypt 
the British agent and consul-general exerted considerable authority on the workings 
of government through a network of British advisers placed in the Egyptian 
government, particularly in the time of Lord Cromer (1883-1907). The mandatory 
administration in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq served as a direct instrument of 
British authority but, in the case of Iraq, British influence continued well after formal 
independence in 1932 through a series of advisors.1 The device of bilateral treaties, 
in Egypt with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, in Jordan with the Anglo-
Transjordan (1928), and in Iraq with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930) and the 
Portsmouth Treaty (1948), was the basis through which Britain formalised relations 
between itself and the respective states and legitimated its interference in domestic 
affairs. 2 During World War II, Britain invoked its rights under these treaties to 
reassert control over Egypt and reoccupy Iraq after the rise of a pro-German 
government in 1941 until the end of the war. The arrangements with the Trucial 
States provided similar legal sanction. 
 
                                                 
1 Stephen Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950: a Political, Social, and Economic History (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1953), 342. 
2 The declaration of February 22, 1922, in which Britain granted Egypt self-government 
though reserved to itself certain important powers while not mutually agreed can be 
similarly characterised. 
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Throughout this period the British government presided over a process of 
constitutional change in which governing institutions were defined, terms of 
nationality formulated, and the rights of citizens, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
delineated. In promoting this course the British authorities invoked the virtues of 
democracy, constitutional government and an active citizenry. This was the case, 
particularly in the mandatory administrations where Britain was entrusted with the 
role by the League of Nations of laying the basis of representative institutions, legal 
and social rights and the protection of minorities. 
 
Despite these claims and commitments, in shaping institutions of governance and a 
culture of citizenship British policy was not driven primarily by such ideals but was 
characterised by a pragmatic and flexible approach, largely qualified by British 
concerns about political stability and calculations made to maintain a continuing 
British presence and its future influence. This was also moderated through 
competing demands of the local population that involved negotiation with the local 
elites and an engagement, whether accommodation or resistance, with popular calls 
for the recognition of particular political, economic, social and cultural rights. The 
results of this political project and the dynamics of the relationship that it 
established would play a significant part in determining the trajectory of citizenship 
as a practice in the post-colonial period. 
 
Constitutional Rules 
Constitutional reform was a central pillar of British rule in both Egypt and the 
mandates. In 1883 soon after the occupation of Egypt, a new constitution (organic 
law) was promulgated that laid the basis for government and administration for the  
next 40 years. Following a sustained nationwide protest against its continued 
presence in 1919-21, the British government unilaterally granted Egypt self-
government and authorised the drafting of a new constitution. Written by a 
committee appointed by the Egyptian government but undoubtedly under some 
British influence, the 1923 constitution was strongly influenced by European and 
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particularly Belgian constitutional practice.3 It established a constitutional monarchy 
drawn from the family of Muhammad ‘Ali with a bicameral parliament. The king as 
executive was accorded very considerable powers with the right to appoint the 
Prime Minister, dismiss the cabinet and the parliament, and declare martial law. The 
popular will was represented by the House of Representatives which was elected by 
popular vote along with three-fifths of the membership of the Senate, while the king 
appointed the remainder.  
 
In the mandates of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, the establishment of a system of 
government and definition of citizenship required deference, in principle at least, 
with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Composed of the 
former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the Class A Mandates (the category 
that included both British and French mandatory administrations in the Middle East) 
were states whose independence was provisionally recognised but which were 
deemed to require a period of tutelage before being granted full status. This period 
therefore necessitated deliberation, negotiation and occasionally insistence on the 
part of the mandatory power, in the process of the codification of an institutional 
basis of government, the powers of the state, and the legal definition of nationality 
and rights of citizenship. 
 
Each of the British mandates offered particular challenges in this respect.4 The state 
of Iraq, composed of the former Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, 
was both an expression of the international ideals of self-determination but also 
British imperial design. Initially founded on the agreement of the League of Nations 
and the Treaty of Lausanne, its principal constitutional document was the Organic 
Law of Iraq (1925), first drafted in 1921 by British officials and subsequently revised 
                                                 
3 Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, Liberalism Without Democracy: Nationhood and Citizenship in 
Egypt, 1922–1936 (Durham : Duke University Press 2006), 130.  
4 Norman Bentwich, “Mandated Territories: Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq),” British 
Yearbook of International Law 2 (1921), 48-56. 
5 
 
after extended Iraqi consultation.5 As with its 1923 Egyptian counterpart, the Iraqi 
constitution provided for a strong monarchy with the Hashemite King Faysal, a 
newcomer to Iraq, paradoxically serving as a figure of national unity. Like Egypt also, 
Iraq possessed a bicameral parliament but with the Senate wholly appointed by the 
King and a Chamber of Deputies elected by universal male suffrage of all Iraqis of 20 
years of age and over. The election process set up an indirect system with primary 
electors voting for secondary selectors (in a ration of 250:1), who in turn would elect 
deputies.6 In Transjordan a similar two stage election process was prescribed (here 
the ration was 200:1) by the Organic Law of 1928 where all males of 18 and over 
were entitled to vote for secondary electors for the 14 elected members of a 21 
member Legislative Council largely advisory as an advisory body to Emir Abdullah, 
brother of Faysal.7  
 
In contrast to the monarchies of Iraq and Transjordan in Palestine the Order in 
Council of 1922 served as the constitution set the British High Commissioner as the 
chief executive and established a Legislative Council as a national representative 
body. 8 From the beginning, however, Palestinian politics was riven with the struggle 
between Arab and Jewish nationalism and the Council foundered with the boycotted 
elections of 1923.9 In 1935 a new British proposal for a legislative body again came 
to nought with only the system of municipal government offering any official avenue 
for political representation.10 Without an effective constitution and representative 
institutions, politics in Palestine was therefore largely determined by the contest 
between Arab and Zionist nationalisms and offered little space for citizen 
involvement at a national level. 
                                                 
5 One of the chief points of discussion had been the powers given to the king which the Iraqi 
committee had thought excessive in the original draft, Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), 15. 
6 Majid Khadduri, The Government of Iraq (Jerusalem: New Publishers Iraq, 1944), 15. Direct 
election was not employed until the elections of January 1953. 
7 Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 97.  
8 Palestine, The Palestine Order in Council, 10 August 1922 
 http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C7AAE196F41AA055052565F50054E656 (accessed 30 
August 2015). 
9 Palestine Royal Commission [henceforth Peel Commission]: Report, 1937, 56. 
10 Peel Commission, 347-352. 
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The National Citizenry  
 
Integral to the process of setting up the constitutional basis for these states was a 
legal definition of nationality and citizen rights. In the case of Egypt this seemed less 
urgent. Although the 1923 constitution contained a section On the Rights and Duties 
of Egyptians stating important principles, until the passing of a new nationality law in 
1928 Egyptian nationality still relied on nineteenth-century Ottoman legislation.  
 
In the mandates, the general principle applied with the nationality laws was that 
former Ottoman subjects would by definition automatically acquire the nationality of 
the state in which they were now resident.11 This was most clearly the case in the 
Iraqi Nationality Law of 1924 and a similar provision was applied in Transjordan. In 
Palestine, where the terms of the mandate had specifically required the 
establishment of a citizenship law, the Palestinian Citizenship Order of 1925 included 
the same provision and thus immediately accorded citizenship to the majority Arab 
population in Palestine.12 However, more particular were the conditions for the 
acquisition of Palestinian citizenship: the applicant had to have been resident for a 
certain period of residence, demonstrate a good character and possess an “adequate 
knowledge” of English, Arabic or Hebrew. The last clearly referenced the promise of 
the British government to support Palestine as a Jewish national homeland (which 
had been formally incorporated into the terms of the mandate), and provided a legal 
support for Jewish immigration and settlement.  
 
                                                 
11 Norman Bentwich, “Nationality in Mandated Territories Detached from Turkey,” British 
Yearbook of International Law 7 (1926), 97. 
12 Norman Bentwich, “Palestine nationality and the mandate,” Journal of Comparative 
Legislation and International Law 21 (1939) 4: 230-232. The term “citizenship” in the 
legislation seems distinctive to Palestine; elsewhere in Iraq and Transjordan the term 
nationality is favoured in the legislation. For a detailed discussion of the period 1917-25, see 
Lauren Banko, “The Creation of Palestinian Citizenship under an International Mandate: 
1918-1925: Legislation, Discourses and Practices,” Citizenship Studies 16  (2012) 15-6: 641-
655.  
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Definitions of nationality were much more exclusive in the Gulf States. Kuwaiti 
nationality was only defined in law in 1948 and was restricted to a narrowly defined 
group made up of members of the ruling family, those who had been permanently 
resident in Kuwait since 1899 (a date which referenced the agreement between 
Britain and Mubarak the Great), and children of Kuwaiti fathers or of Arab or Muslim 
men born in Kuwait after that time. Naturalisation was allowed after 10 years’ 
residence but was also conditional on Arabic proficiency.13 A decade later in 1959 
the law was amended with 1920 (the year of the war between Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait) now set as the date by which permanent residence was established while 
the requirements for naturalisation became more restricted.14 With the withdrawal 
of the British and independence in 1961, citizenship was soon extended to many 
Bedouin in return for military service which was used effectively to break down 
loyalties to tribal sheikhs and to secure electoral loyalty.15  
 
These various legal definitions of the national citizen posed as the antithesis to the 
foreign national. Here the long tradition of the Ottoman Capitulations, a regime of 
legal and economic privileges enjoyed by foreign nationals that dated back to at least 
the sixteenth-century, had emphasised the advantages of foreign nationality over 
the comparative disadvantages of local citizenship. Indeed, for this reason the 
extrajudicial rights enjoyed by foreigners became an increasing target of nationalist 
criticism from the late nineteenth-century for compromising local sovereignty and 
reinforcing the hierarchy of the colonial order. With the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire the Capitulations were abolished in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, 
presumably as contrary the principles of the mandate. In Egypt, the state with the 
most established historical identity, they paradoxically remained in force until their 
abolition in the Treaty of Montreux in 1937. The regime of Mixed Courts, created in 
1875 to deal with legal disputes between Egyptians and foreigners, lingered on until 
                                                 
13 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 79, 186n.  
14 Anh Nga Longva, “Citizenship in the Gulf States, Conceptualization and Practice,” in 
Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, ed. Nils A. 
Butenschon et al. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 185. 
15 Crystal, Oil and Politics, 88. In the same year, a nationality law granted Qatari citizenship 
to those who had been resident in Qatar prior to 1930 (Crystal, Oil and Politics, 149-50). 
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their dissolution in 1949 even if some of practices if not rights given to those with 
foreign nationality continued in some form, particularly in the justice system.16  
 
Minority Rights 
The Ottoman Empire had been governed by a Muslim political elite which 
accommodated different religious communities through the millet system that 
delegated authority to the community on matters of property and personal status. 
While this system had been significantly eroded under the impact of the Tanzimat, 
religious and ethnic identity still remained important social markers in Middle 
Eastern society at the end of the First World War. The dismemberment of the 
Empire after the war with the consequent dislocation of different ethnic and 
religious communities called for new political arrangements which took some 
account of this pluralism. Here the British solution was to grant certain recognition 
to the rights and claims of certain minorities, in part because it had the virtue of 
winning the support of these communities but also because it satisfied the 
requirements of the League of Nations.  
 
In Iraq this religious and ethnic diversity which comprised the three large 
communities of the Shi‘ites, Sunnis and Kurds, along with smaller groups such as the 
Turkomen, Yazidis and various Christians sects, offered particular challenges to the 
project of nationhood and national citizenship. To accommodate this diversity the 
British authorities allocated specific sectarian representation at different levels of 
government. At the local level the Provincial and District Councils provided for 
representation for non-Muslims with dedicated seats for Christian, Jewish, Sabaean 
and Yazidi communities. At the national level the Chamber of Deputies included 
fourJewish and Christian deputies each out of a total of 88 members during the 
mandate period. The principle if not the specific figures continued into the 1950s.17 
                                                 
16 Anthony Gorman, “Regulation, Reform and Resistance in the Middle East Prison,” In 
Cultures of Confinement: A History of the Prison in Africa, Asia and Latin America, ed. Frank 
Dikötter and Ian Brown (London: Hurst, 2007), 114-115. 
17 These consisted of two Christian and one Jewish representative in Mosul; two Christians 
and two Jews in Baghdad, and one Christian and one Jew in Basra province, Khadduri, 
Government of Iraq, 15, 305. 
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In Transjordan, where the population was more homogeneous, minority 
communities were also granted specific representatives. The first Transjordanian 
Legislative Council (1928-31), made up of 16 elected members (and 22 members in 
all), allocated five seats to minorities (two Circassian and three Christian 
representatives).  
 
Such provisions in part were designed to provide specific communities with a 
guaranteed voice in the new political system but they offered the potential for 
distortion of the principle of equal representation for political gain. In Transjordan 
Circassians enjoyed representation more than fivefold the mainstream Muslim 
population in proportion to their numbers, a policy likely to have been prompted by 
the generally pro-palace sentiment of that community.18 The legal recognition of 
tribal rights both in Jordan and Iraq demonstrated a similar strategy of working 
within existing social hierarchies in order to win support. In Transjordan two tribal 
representatives (one each from the north and south) were appointed to the 
Legislative Council by a local commission of ten members while tribal sheikhs in Iraq 
were granted the right to adjudicate disputes and collect taxes.19  
 
In addition to political representation, was the recognition of religious rights and 
cultural rights to maintain separate education systems.20 In Iraq, Kurdish primary 
schools were established in the north of the country and there were soon demands 
for Kurdish secondary schools and a Training College. The Local Languages Law of 
1926 allowed for the use of Kurdish in administration and primary schools in the 
north but Arabic remained the principal language of instruction in secondary and 
                                                 
18 Notionally one elected member represented 5000 Circassians, 7000 Christians and 27000 
Muslims. The first post-independence constitution of 1947 which replaced the Organic Law 
continued this practice with the 20 elected members of the Assembly being made up of 12 
Muslims, four Christians, two tribal representatives and two representatives for Circassians 
and Chechens, see Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics 
in the Arab World (Boulder CO, London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 135, 137. 
19 Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London and New York: IB Tauris, 1993), 115; 
Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 37. 
20 For Palestine, see Peel Commission, 48, 52-53. 
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higher education.21 With the failure of the creation of genuine civil spirit these 
divisions could take on political implications. In Palestine the recognition of English, 
Hebrew and Arabic as official languages and the constitutional right for different 
communities to maintain their own schooling system in their own language saw the 
separate development of education and civic ideals, a fact later bewailed by the Peel 
Commission.22  
 
Formal recognition was only one way in which rights for minority groups might be 
acknowledged. Just as Copts had been favoured in the Egyptian bureaucracy before 
the First World War so British policy of favouring Sunnis (only about 20% of the total 
population) in the Iraqi administration at the expense of the Shi‘ites and Kurds also 
undermined a genuine sense of national community that could be exploited later by 
politicians.23 In Iraq this would have great implications in the immediate post-
independence era. The Assyrians, a Christian refugee community from Anatolia, who 
were favoured by the British in the recruitment of the Iraqi levies during the 1920s, 
were left exposed as perceived allies of the British after independence was granted 
in 1932. Despite the guarantees that had been offered by the Iraqi government to 
respect minorities, too readily accepted by the British, the violent suppression of the 
Assyrians in 1933 demonstrated the fractures in the new national community.24 The 
potential for tension between the concepts of national citizen and community 
member has continued until the present in various forms. 
 
In its dealing with the issue of minority representation, British policy never 
institutionalised sectarian identity to the extent that the French administration did in 
Lebanon. However, the formal recognition of ethnic identity, ostensibly contrived to 
be inclusive could also serve as an effective divide-and-rule strategy that arguably 
undermined the concept of a single national citizenry. In Egypt, a country which had 
                                                 
21 Orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 44, 182-3. 
22 Peel Commission 36-37: Articles 15 and 22 recognise different languages and each 
community entitled ‘to maintain its own schools for the education of its members in its own 
language.’ see also Peel Commission, 333-334. 
23 Tripp, History of Iraq, 31.  
24 Tripp, History of Iraq, 80. 
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the longest tradition of political and social continuity, British machinations at times 
fed social tension between religious and ethnic groups. Jews and Copts, as well as 
many foreigners, had been favoured by the British in government employment in the 
years before the First World War. In the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 
1922, the notion of a national community was further undermined by the British 
insistence on reserving to itself the right of protection of the minorities, a position 
that ran the risk of implicating Copts and Egyptian Jewry within the colonial order. 
The subsequent discussion and rejection by the Egyptian constitutional committee of 
a provision for separate parliamentary representation for Copts was significantly 
preoccupied with how the British government might exploit this issue.25 While the 
majority decision to reject such a provision was later styled as a statement of the 
integrity of the national citizen body the ongoing issue of Coptic representation in 
parliament demonstrates its continuing political sensitivity and the religious 
dimension that has been applied to Egyptian citizenship. 
 
The Citizen and Political Rights 
In presiding over a process of codification of nationality laws and constitutions, and 
the recognition of various minority rights, the British sought to lay the foundation of 
and win support for its programme of state-building. Nationality laws served to 
define citizen status but specific rights were often undefined or circumscribed by law 
and, in any case, conceived from the top down. The restrictive nature of these legal 
formulations and the constraints of local practices severely inhibited the growth of 
an active and genuine citizenship.  
 
This was particularly the case with political rights and representation. In Egypt the 
British occupation of the country in 1882 and the defeat of Ahmad ‘Urabi’s 
movement had represented, among other things, a defeat for Egyptian 
constitutionalism. Now under British occupation, the new constitution of 1883 laid 
down provisions for a consultative body although with weak powers. Subsequent 
developments, the setting up of a Legislative Council, General Assembly and 
                                                 
25 B. L Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics, 1918-1952 (Cairo: American University on Cairo 
Press, 1986), 133-142. 
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Provincial Councils, put in place a complex system of indirect elections that in theory 
were popularly elected but which in reality were dominated by the notability. This 
strategy became characteristic of British policy in the Middle East. Writing in his 
annual report presented to the British parliament, Cromer drew deeply from the well 
of orientalist imagery and made clear the paternal principle at work, that the 
majority of the Egyptian population was not yet qualified, and not even willing, to 
exercise full political rights, 
…the interests of the masses must continue to a great extent to be 
represented by European officials or by Egyptian officials who have 
assimilated European ideas. No paper constitution, however ably conceived, 
can suddenly give voice and representation to a people who have for 
centuries been voiceless and unrepresented, and who have not as yet given 
any practical proof that they wish to be represented, although the 
opportunity for expressing the wish is afforded to them.26 
 
This self-serving position of a contained political class was further exemplified in its 
attitude towards political parties. The first formal political parties in Egypt were 
established in 1907, the same year Cromer was writing, predominantly as vehicles 
for nationalist sentiment. Before long they were dissolved amidst British concerns of 
mounting political opposition and social unrest. The rise of the Wafd after the First 
World War, followed by a number of smaller parties under the constitutional 
arrangements of 1923, demonstrated that political life was dominated by elements 
of the traditional landowning elites with limited input from the party membership 
even if it did at times attract a mass following.  
 
In Iraq during the 1920s party political life was similarly restricted in scope, 
programme and levels of participation. Already in 1922 the late Ottoman pro-Arab 
groups of al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi and Haras al-Istiqlal had given way to a series of new 
political organisations formed largely in response to the question of Iraqi 
                                                 
26 Parliamentary Papers, Egypt. No. 1, Reports by His Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General on 
the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan in 1906, No. 1 (1907), 
29.  
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independence and its ongoing relationship with Britain but they offered little 
diversity in their domestic political programmes.27 Moreover, the scope for political 
opposition was limited, a point made clear by the banning of political parties and the 
dissolution of parliament in 1922 by the British High Commissioner, Percy Cox, 
following public protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.28 When party political life 
resumed later in the decade it once again revolved around an elite circle of notables 
and their personal followings. New parties, such as the ‘Ahd Party of Nuri al-Sa‘id, 
formed at the beginning of the 1930s on a common platform of ending the mandate, 
demonstrated the weakness of party political life by dissolving themselves soon after 
Iraqi independence was recognised in 1932; they had lost their raison d’être. 29 The 
emergence soon after of the Ahali Group, a coalition of intellectuals and 
professionals, signalled a new and progressive vision that articulated a democratic 
programme based on liberal, even socialist, ideas such as freedom of speech, human 
rights, equality and justice. Hemmed in by repressive government, these ideals were 
compromised by Ahali’s relationship with the military after the coup in 1936.30 Not 
until after the Second World War did organised political life revive but the pattern 
established in the 1920s of personalised organisations subsequently suppressed by 
government seemed set. A number of parties were closed down in 1948, then, after 
a period of relative freedom, were again dissolved in 1954 in response to their 
opposition to the Baghdad Treaty. The potential for a citizenry actively engaged in 
political life suffered accordingly.  
 
In Palestine, party political life was also limited. Until the early 1930s Arab political 
activity centred around the Arab Executive Committee, an umbrella body that 
convened a series of congresses.31 The establishment of the Istiqlal Party in 1932 
marked the beginning of a period of more formal party organisations but those that 
followed again served more as vehicles for the traditional elites and their followers 
                                                 
27 Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 29-30.  
28 Tariq Y. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq (Cambridge, New York, 
N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 13. 
29 Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 29-30. 
30 Tripp, History of Iraq, 84-86. 
31 Peel Commission, 176. 
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rather than any real ideological programme.32 In the mid-1930s all but the Istiqlal 
Party united to form the Higher Arab Committee but were subsequently banned by 
the British in October 1937, following the outbreak of the Arab Revolt. Zionist party 
life represented a greater range across the political spectrum on the left and right 
but all ultimately shared an exclusive nationalism. 
 
In the Gulf participatory politics was governed as much by a restricted franchise as 
political space. Municipal government provided the forum for the exercise of 
political rights, at least for the local merchant class. In Bahrain this was established 
at the beginning of the 1920s and progressively acquired authority from the British 
political agent.33 In Kuwait, the establishment of the municipality in 1930 the 
biennial elections provided a regular platform for a political contest among the 
mercantile notability. This political momentum culminated in the Majlis movement 
of 1938 where elements of the merchant class sought to challenge the authority of 
the ruling family and speak in the name of the people. 34 The formation of the 
National Bloc as the first political party in Kuwait and the convening of an Assembly 
in July over the next six months saw the drafting of a basic law. Ultimately, however, 
the movement collapsed, after initial British encouragement was withdrawn when it 
felt its interests threatened.35  
 
One important exception across the region where a genuine political activism 
organisation emerged from beyond the realm of traditional fiefdoms or, as in 
Palestine, outside apart fromof the bipolar contest between Jewish and Arab 
nationalisms, was the communist movement. First evident with the establishment of 
the Egyptian Communist Party in the early 1920s, the movement was quickly 
repressed. Egyptian nationalists who had been critical of the British suppression of 
political life before 1914 were quick to show that they were just as willing to 
                                                 
32 Peel Commission, 87. Among these parties were the Palestine Arab Party (Husseini family); 
the National Defence Party (Nashashibi family) and the Arab Reform Party (Khalidi family), 
all set up in the 1934-35 period. 
33 Nelida Fuccaro, Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 124-125. 
34 Crystal, Oil and Politics, 46-47. 
35 Crystal, Oil and Politics, 48-51. 
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suppress the challenge of radical reform perceived in the Bolshevik threat. The trial 
and imprisonment of communist leaders in Cairo in 1924 was the first significant 
blow in the campaign that continued throughout the decade and drove the 
movement underground until its reappearance during the Second World War.36 A 
similar phenomenon occurred in Iraq and Palestine over the following decade, with 
the Iraqi elites in the former and British authorities in the latter case, imprisoning or 
expelling communist activists.37  
 
The Press and Freedom of Speech  
If party political life tightly circumscribed by law and dominated by elite factions, 
freedom of speech and particularly the press offered greater potential as a forum for 
the promotion of new political and social ideas, the criticism and debate of 
government policies, and the demands for citizen rights. Here Britain showed itself 
willing to consolidate and expand the Ottoman strategy of restricting the acceptable 
spectrum of free speech.  
 
By the middle of the nineteenth century the press in the Middle East had begun to 
emerge as a medium for more than government notices and carry public news and 
political opinion. The promulgation of the Ottoman press law of 1865 launched a 
tradition of press regulation that would seek to control this outlet by stipulating 
certain qualifications for newspaper ownership (30 years of age and no criminal 
record) and in time increasingly constrain the freedom to express political opinion. In 
Egypt the Publications Law of 1881 provided greater restrictions on freedom of 
speech and brought in imprisonment as a judicial punishment for transgressors. By 
contrast the British occupation the next year was followed by a period of relative 
freedom until the reinstatement then reinforcement of the press laws in early 1909 
formed part of a general crackdown on the insurgent nationalist movement.38  
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Yet, while the virtues of a free and open press were regularly intoned, and indeed, 
often endorsed by constitutions, the banning of newspapers and other publications 
that were (usually) deemed to have exceeded appropriate criticism of government 
policy or figures was common. The Ottoman press laws were carried over in large 
part into the interwar period but mandatory administrations and their successors 
readily added to this regulatory and increasingly punitive regime.39 Press freedom 
may have been guaranteed explicitly in the constitution but it was also limited by 
expressed concerns about safeguarding the ‘public order’.40 During the interwar 
period in Egypt the changing press law regime required greater financial guarantees 
for newspaper ownership and afforded less press freedom under an increasingly 
repressive penal code. The practice of suspending or banning newspapers became a 
regular practice during the 1920s and 1930s, that included not only oppositional 
party newspapers deemed to be a danger to the fundamental safety of the state but 
journalists were imprisoned for criticising in print the government or king.41 
 
In late Ottoman era Iraq and Palestine, a press had also begun to forge a tradition of 
public comment and discourse of rights.42 After the end of the First World War as 
new state boundaries were drawn, this tradition continued and with greater energy. 
In Iraq, newspapers in English, Arabic, Turkish, and Kurdish launched in 1918-19 
engaged with the pressing political issues of the day.43 Beside the sober Government 
Gazette a series of dailies presented a range of opinions on the political future and 
constitutional regime of Iraq. Al-Istiqlal, for example, launched in September 1920, 
proposed a Hashemite monarchy, while Al-Djila called for a republic; all called for 
democracy in which the importance of freedom of speech should be clearly 
recognised. The authorities thought otherwise when, for example, after carrying an 
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editorial hostile to King Faisal, al-Djila was banned.44 The practice of state regulation 
of the press was maintained thereafter and indeed codified in the Iraqi constitution 
of 1930.45 The policy continued into the independence era. A Press Bureau was 
established and the press law of 1954, issued following the hostile response to the 
Iraqi government’s signing of the Baghdad Pact, made clear the limitations of the 
freedom of speech.46 
 
In Palestine likewise an increasingly regulated and restrictive press regime developed 
in response to growing political agitation. The Shaw Commission’s recommendation 
of “the curtailment of the mischievous activities of the Press” was formalised with a 
Press Ordinance in 1933 which required a licence for the publication of a newspaper 
and allowed for the suspension of a newspaper that was “likely to endanger the 
public peace”.47 In the following years both Hebrew and Arabic language papers 
suffered suspension and prosecution.48 In 1936 alone Arab newspapers were 
suspended 34 times and warned officially on 11 occasions. Responding to what it 
saw as the continuous negative tone of much of the Arab press (“The Arab Press 
excelled itself in denunciation of the Government and the Jews”49), the Peel 
Commission recommended a further extension in the powers of the press laws, a 
strategy that assisted in suppressing the Arab Revolt and was facilitated by the 
introduction of the Emergency Regulations.50 The press played a similar role of 
representing the voice for an increasingly articulate citizenry in the Gulf. In Bahrain 
from at least the 1940s, it served as an important forum for the discussion of 
democratic values, the rights of the individual and in the 1950s pro-Arab nationalist 
ideas, despite the attempts of the British Agency to curb criticism and maintain the 
political status quo were able to be disseminated.51 
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The Citizen as Worker 
If party political rights remained limited and the right to freedom of expression was 
often curbed, the demand for social and economic rights could come from other 
quarters. The labour movement provided one important locus for this struggle 
where (usually) male workers used the threat or actual withdrawal of their labour to 
secure an improvement---- in their working conditions, particularly regarding pay, 
hours of work and safety conditions---- from employers and legal recognition from 
state authorities within a broader framework of workers’ economic rights. 
  
The emergence of an organised modern labour movement in the Arab world begins 
in Egypt with the industrial action and establishment of workers associations at the 
end of the nineteenth century.52 Initially the movement was predominantly led by 
foreign workers but even before   World War I, the cause of the workers rights had 
been taken up by the nationalist movement and represented as part of a broader 
programme of citizen rights. During this stage the state authorities often took little 
action beyond a policing role during violent confrontations between workers and 
employers, or at times facilitated negotiations. However, as the movement gained 
support and power it became a more significant expression of social forces, 
especially after World War I. 
 
In 1919 the labour protests in Egypt, part of a campaign of widespread resistance to 
continued occupation, prompted the government to create the Labour Conciliation 
Board In August 1919 which recognised the principle of the rights of workers and the 
need to provide official avenues of redress while at the same time offering a means 
of containing an unpredictable and occasionally unruly social movement.53 However, 
largely siding with the employer, the Board proved ineffective at dealing with labour 
disputes and was replaced by the Labour Office In 1930 (later the Labour 
Department in 1936), ominously a part of the Public Security Department and 
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drawing on staff from security agencies which suggested a tone of repression over 
concession.54 It was not until September 1942 that the pro-British Wafd government 
granted the first legal recognition of trade unions, which had to be registered by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs.55 However, the state strategy of cooptation and control of 
the labour movement that had already been established would characterise the 
post-1952 approach to state-labour relations.56 
 
In Iraq, where the extent of industrialisation and the size of the workforce was less 
than in Egypt, an organised labour movement was later in emerging. Even at the end 
of the 1920s, the oil companies (Iraq Petroleum Company and the Khanaqin Oil 
Company), which employed about 3000 workers between them, and the railways, 
with about 5700 workers, provided the only significant mass workforces.57 From the 
last emerged probably the first genuine labour union, the Artisans (or Mechanics) 
Association (Jam‘iyyat Ashab al-San‘a), established in 1929 under the leadership of 
Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz during a campaign of strike action calling for better 
conditions and labour laws. Railway workers also launched strikes in 1930-31 calling 
for a reduction in working hours.58 In the last full year of the mandate the potential 
for labour to serve as an expression for the social rights of citizens became manifest. 
In response to an increasingly difficult economic climate, exacerbated by the 
imposition of a municipal tax, the union organised the general strike in Baghdad in 
July 1931. The authorities responded by dissolving the Artisans Association while the 
workers reacted by setting up the Workers Federation of Iraq the following year. 
Following an organised boycott against the British-owned Baghdad Electric Light and 
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Power Company in 1933-34, the Federation was banned and the labour movement 
was suppressed for the next decade even if labour disruptions would continue.59  
 
This series of strikes had it made clear to some Iraqi politicians that there needed to 
be some recognition of the rights of workers. In December 1931, a proposal was put 
before the Chamber of Deputies calling for the limitation of working hours, provision 
of holiday pay and preference for local over foreign labour in foreign companies. 
After considerable debate, the proposal was passed and forwarded to the 
government for consideration.60 This was the beginning of a formal if limited 
recognition by the state of the importance of labour and indeed may have been 
prompted by the establishment of a Department of Labour Affairs, one of the 
conditions of joining the League of Nations.61 The Labour Code of 1936 marked 
another step in workers’ protection even if it appears not to have been fully 
implemented.62 That same year with the coup of Bakr Sidqi the military took on a 
leading role in dealing with industrial disputes.63 Workers’ rights remained on the 
agenda. In 1940 an attempt to amend the electoral law and provide for specific trade 
union parliamentary representation was blocked by the Minister of Justice, acting on 
advice of his British advisor, Sir Edwin Drower.64 In 1942 an amendment to the 
Labour Code of 1936 legislated better conditions for female workers and a range of 
other measures, including paid holidays, workers’ compensation and a mechanism 
for arbitrating labour disputes. Before the end of the war various trade unions had 
been formed and Labour Exchanges established by the government to deal with 
problems of unemployment. The formation of a “Rights of Workmen” movement 
during this period showed the labour movement embracing a broader political 
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strategy. 65 The immediate postwar years witnessed greater union activity while the 
government sought to respond to workers’ demands with the aid of a British labour 
expert.66 
 
In Palestine the struggle for workers’ rights was reflected in the contest between the 
Zionist and Arab nationalist movements. The Histadrut, a federation of Jewish labour 
established in 1920, defended the cause of Jewish labour and would be one of a 
number of proto-state Zionist institutions which would form part of the state of 
Israel. Arab labour began to organise itself during the 1920s with the establishment 
of the Palestine Arab Workers Society (PAWS) by railway workers in Haifa in 1925, 
partly a response to the Histadrut’s hostile attitude to the establishment of a non-
Zionist union.67 A nationwide Arab labour conference held in January 1930 brought 
together a broad spectrum of labour activists calling for an eight hour week, the right 
to strike and the formation of a Palestinian Arab federation, criticising at the same 
time the British use of Jewish contractors and the anti-Arab character of the 
Histadrut policies. In response, the Histadrut established an Arab section in May 
1932, called the Palestine Labour League, which continued as a separate 
organisation until 1959 when Israeli Arabs were finally allowed to join Histadrut as 
full members.68  
 
In Palestine, as in Egypt, the British administration sought to recognise and coopt 
workers’ claims by setting up a Labour Department in 1942 and charged it with 
responsibility for the investigation of working conditions, the regulation of trade 
unions and labour legislation.69 In the critical period after the Second World War a 
number of organisations merged to form the Arab Workers Congress and continued 
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to agitate for workers’ rights, sometimes in collaboration with members of PAWS 
and the Histadrut but ultimately the looming confrontation of 1948 would see a 
nationalist terms of reference trump common workers’ demands. 
 
The demand for the rights of workers in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq emerged out of a 
broader political struggle, at times nationalist, at times class-based, which brought 
attention to various social and economic claims. In the Gulf, workers also fought for 
social rights but the different dynamics between nationality and worker saw 
different outcomes. In Bahrain during the 1940s and 1950s workers played an 
important part in seeking to establish a public space for a genuine and engaged 
citizen body.70 By contrast, in Kuwait where the relationship between worker and 
national was rather different, other considerations came into play. Here Kuwaiti 
legislation was used to preempt the danger of cooperation between the local and 
growing foreign work force by separating the Kuwaiti workforce from foreign labour 
by offering the former specific privileges.71 In 1959 a labour law gave nationals 
priority in the hiring of workers in the Kuwaiti Oil Company and legislation regarding 
the formation of unions provided Kuwaitis, then Arabs, certain privileges before 
foreign workers. In 1965 two labour federations were formed and subsequently 
merged in the General Federation of Kuwaiti Workers, now coopted by the state. 
Similar tactics were used in government employment when the Civil Service Law of 
1960 reserved senior posts and pensions for Kuwaitis only. 
 
British Legacies 
British power in the Middle East oversaw a process governed by the interplay 
between its imperial policies, calculated compromises between British authorities 
and local elites, and a range of responses to popular action determined the forum 
for the contestation of citizen rights. The constitutions laid down in Egypt, Palestine, 
Transjordan and Iraq, employed the language of nationality, of representative 
institutions, of the rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech raised the 
expectations for an active citizenship. However, the exercise of political rights 
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through the ballot box, of freedom of speech through publication and legal recourse, 
were marginalised and neutralised, often by the very legal system itself. The 
constriction of party political life, the use of imprisonment to curb opposition voices, 
and the censorship of the press had become a feature of Egyptian political life even 
before the First World War and would be taken up elsewhere.  
 
In Iraq, the British vision to create a new state and citizenry rested on the legal 
foundation of a constitution, nationality law and recognition of minority rights. Yet, 
the effectiveness of these legal instruments was encumbered by British imperial 
purpose and its compromise with local elites. Political, social and economic rights 
often remained abstract without a sufficient local engagement or support for them 
to be sustained and developed. As Khadduri noted, “The form of the Iraq 
Government was determined [… ] under the impact of Western ideals; the forces 
which affected its working were to be found in existing local conditions.” 72 Nor was 
there an adequate local institutional basis for their implementation.73 According to 
Abu Jaber the situation in Jordan was not much different, 
 
The Organic Law [of 1928] was not meant to advance the cause of 
democracy, nor did it encourage the Jordanian people along the path of 
experimentation with democracy. If anything, even the less-than-average 
voter became cynical and disinterested. The mandatory power, in its 
preoccupation with stability and its shortsighted self-interest prevented the 
growth of a healthy opposition.74 
 
State institutions were unable to support the emergence of a participatory 
citizenship resulting in a general failure in nurturing a genuine civic spirit and 
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allegiance to the state. Commenting on Iraq in the late 1930s some years after the 
end of the mandate, Ireland noted  
 
An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness embracing the 
State. Not yet had a sense of loyalty and duty to the nation arisen to 
surmount the differences between tribesmen and townsmen, between Sunni 
and Shi’i, and between Muslims and minority communities or to replace 
personal opportunism. Patriotism still denoted independence without 
obligations to the State.75 
 
In Palestine the attempt to construct a state and citizen body rested on the obvious 
tension, if not contradiction, of British support for a Jewish national homeland and 
Arab claims of self-determination. By the mid-1930s the idea of Palestinian 
citizenship had proved a manifest failure and the British vision of a common 
citizenship open to both Arab and Jew was not shared widely.76 Instead the 
aspirations of citizenship were largely mediated through the contest between Arab 
and Zionist for political sovereignty in Palestine. As the Peel Commission stated in 
1936: “[…] to maintain that Palestinian citizenship has any moral meaning is a 
mischievous pretence. Neither Arab nor Jew has any sense of service to a single 
State.”77 Its recommendation of partition recognised the impasse and subsequent 
events made the failure utterly apparent. With the triumph of the Zionist movement 
in 1948, this legacy of mutually exclusive visions laid the basis for the differential 
citizenship that has since operated in Israel where Arab citizen have been accorded 
second class status. 
 
The legal protections and the constitutional guarantees notwithstanding, the range 
of strategies employed by the British government, often with willing local elites, to 
undermine the citizen rights were embraced by their local successor governments to 
even greater significant effect after the departure of the British. Martial law was 
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favoured means to suspend the civil code readily taken up by the post-independence 
governments to deal with political disorder. Applied in Egypt by the British from 
1914 until 1923, it was later proclaimed by Egyptian governments on a number of 
occasions, such as in 1947, in May 1948 and again in January 1952, to facilitate state 
repression without being impeded by legal safeguards.78 Under the post-1952 
regime it became a standard instrument in the guise of the State of Emergency Law, 
applied through much of the period 1967-2011. In Palestine, a range of security 
regulations developed during the mandate period qualified or suspended legal 
rights, such as after the Wailing Wall incident in 1929, and with the introduction of 
Emergency Regulations during the Arab Revolt of the late 1930s.79 In Israel martial 
law was introduced among the Arab population from the foundation of the state 
until 1966. In Iraq it was employed frequently to deal with episodes of civil unrest 
from 1935, again in 1948, 1952 and 1956.80  
 
With the constraints on the practice of citizenship rights, progressive social forces 
sought by various means to articulate, demonstrate and remonstrate their claims for 
rights. In this political organisations (if not formally recognised parties), the press 
and social movements such as the labour movement played an important part in 
seeking to counter an increasingly authoritarian state in liberal dress. The record of 
the freedom of the press and labour activism across these states shows that these 
avenues of expression and spaces for an engaged citizenship while active were 
seriously impeded by political, social and economic obstacles and the claims for 
rights were often compromised, ignored, manipulated or modified. The press as an 
oppositional voice was often strangled and social actors such as the labour 
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movement were coopted or forced underground. Similar battles were fought by 
other civil society organisations such as youth groups and women’s associations.81  
 
At a rhetorical level British policy claimed at laying the foundations of a democratic 
polity and enfranchised citizenry but in practice this was compromised by its priority 
for political stability and the defence of its interests. The record of British rule shows 
that security concerns outranked citizen rights and constitutional freedoms gave way 
to reasons of state when required. In certain circumstances citizen freedoms were 
brutally qualified most dramatically with the violent suppression of the Arab Revolt 
in Palestine, the toppling of the al-Gaylani government and reoccupation of Iraq in 
1941, and the February 1942 incident in Cairo where King Faruq was forced to install 
a pro-British Wafd government demonstrated that the reality of an independent, 
democratic country governed by its citizens was far from being the case. In due 
course this pattern of privileging political stability and defending its hold on power 
practiced by the British authorities was embraced and extended by local elites.  
 
Conclusion 
In negotiating its imperial interests, international obligations and engagement with 
local elites, the British government oversaw the emergence of a model of citizenship 
in the Middle East that was both limited and qualified. While in principle based on a 
model of some form of participatory democracy, British policymakers favoured 
government controlled by a strong executive head, most often a monarch, in which 
appointed officials and indirect representation through a secondary voting system 
muffled the potential impact of the popular electorate. Political parties, where 
permitted, often reflected the interests of traditional elites and rarely represented a 
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broader public interest. In nurturing this type of political system and citizenry, Britain 
was more easily able to maintain its control, at least in the short term. Where new 
organisations or groups sought to challenge the status quo, as did the communist 
movement, liberal intellectuals and the labour movement, they were marginalised, 
repressed or coopted by the regime. In this environment the recognition of formal 
rights or favourable policies to minority communities risked the emergence of a 
unified citizen body and provided political opportunities that were both exploited by 
the British themselves and had the potential to be employed by elements among the 
indigenous elites to scapegoat or favour particular groups.  
 
Whether formally bound by the obligations of the mandate as in Palestine, 
Transjordan and Iraq, or elsewhere where they were less accountable to the 
international community, British policies nurtured a calculated compromise between 
the promotion of a flawed constitutional democracy and its own imperial purpose. In 
Iraq, balancing the support of the local elites and the ethnic configuration of the 
state sustained British geopolitical interests, at least for a time, but resulted in an 
unstable state with an uneven regime of political, social and economic rights. In 
Palestine, the attempt to construct a stable polity foundered on the incompatibility 
of two (or three) conflicting national visions where no general sense of common 
national citizenship developed between Arab and Jewish communities. As the Peel 
Commission noted in 1937, Palestine had become not a unified state and society but 
a land of three flags and three governments where “[…] instead of being drawn 
together by the common forms and symbols of a single citizenship [the two 
communities] have adopted the forms and symbols of separate nationhood.”82 In 
the Gulf states the longstanding treaty arrangements between Britain and the local 
ruling families provided the latter with the ability to constrain the participation of an 
active citizenry. The political contest between the ruling families and the merchant 
class that marked much of the interwar period was, with the arrival of oil revenues, 
reconfigured so that with British compliance the largesse of the state was able to 
underwrite a generous social entitlement for an exclusive citizenry even as the 
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exercise of political rights and freedom of speech was circumscribed. These different 
arrangements and the strategies adopted to counter challenges to them had a clear 
impact on the development of the body politic and the political culture that would 
inform the subsequent development of citizenship in the post-colonial age. 
 
Ultimately, the British legacy was of illiberal democracy where limited citizen rights 
appeared more rhetorical than real and the institutions set up to service them were 
not properly rooted in local society but compromised by imperial design and local 
elite interest. The traditional political classes themselves were willing to effectively 
constrain any sense of active dynamic citizenship, often using the authority of the 
law to contain opposition, curb criticism and limit activism. In the post-colonial 
period, the weakness of these liberal institutions and their failure to implant a 
genuine sense of citizenship and empowerment among the population continued to 
undermine the state as a genuine vehicle for the expression of the popular will. The 
undignified British withdrawal from Palestine in May 1948 demonstrated its most 
dramatic failure in constructing a common citizenship but the toppling of the 
monarchies by the military of Egypt and Iraq in the 1950s showed that the basis for 
the republican authoritarian state had already been laid.  
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